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Abstract 
Tseng and his colleagues have proposed two variants of authenticated encryption scheme using self-certified 
public keys. Their schemes have two fundamental properties. Only the intended receiver can recover the 
message while verifying the signature, and each user can use his own private key independently without system 
authority learning about it. This paper presents man-in-the-middle attacks to both Tseng and his colleagues 
authenticated encryption variants. It will be shown that these schemes are not secure against this attack. 
Keywords: Self-certified public key; Authenticated encryption; Digital signature; Man-in-the-middle attack. 
1. Introduction 
Digital signature plays a key role in modern cryptographic communications. It not only provides authenticity 
and integrity, but also digital signature brings non-repudiation with it. Like ElGamal digital signature scheme 
[2], the basic digital signature sends the message via its signature as an appendix, and like Tseng and his 
colleagues authenticated encryption scheme [11], the digital signature with message recovery encrypts the 
message in the signature. 
In 1991, Girault [4] introduced a novel public key cryptosystem called self-certified public key. In this 
cryptosystem every user is able to choose his own private key. This means that in self-certified public key 
cryptosystems each user's public key is generated by a system, while the private key is only known by the user 
himself. Three years later, in1994, Nyberg and Rueppel [7] introduced a digital signature scheme with message 
recovery based on discrete logarithm problem. The digital signature scheme with message recovery is a digital 
signature scheme in which the message is embedded in the signature and the verifier is able to recover the 
message as he verifies the signature.  
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In 1994, Horster and his colleagues [5] presented a modification to Nyberg and Rueppel’s scheme. In their 
modified scheme, only the specified receiver could verify and recover the intended message. Based on the three 
schemes mentioned above, in 2003, Tseng and his colleagues [11] proposed two variants of self-certified 
authenticated encryption schemes: 1) The authenticated encryption scheme, 2) The authenticated encryption 
scheme with message linkages. The authenticated encryption scheme is the integration of digital signature and 
encryption scheme. In the authenticated encryption scheme, only the specified receiver can verify and recover 
the embedded message. It can provide authenticity, privacy and integrity in a smaller bandwidth since the 
intended message would not be sent by the digital signature as an appendix. The authenticated encryption 
scheme with message linkages is applicable for large messages. In the authenticated encryption scheme with 
message linkages, each message M must be divided into a sequence of smaller messages like {𝑀𝑀1, … ,𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛}. The 
scheme helps linking the message blocks to prevent messages being reordered, partially deleted, or replicated 
during transmissions. In 2004, Xie and his colleagues [12] claimed that Tseng and his colleagues authenticated 
encryption scheme with message linkages is insecure against forgery attack. They provided a forgery attack 
based on the substitution of specified receiver’s secret key. They demonstrated that Tseng and his colleagues 
authenticated encryption schemes are not secure in cases that the verifier substitutes his secret key, or when the 
verifier collaborates with another verifier and selects the measurable secret key for him. Their Cryptanalysis 
works only when the attack comes from system authority which contradicts the assumption made by Tseng and 
his colleagues [11] that system authority is trustworthy. However, in 2007, Chen and Jan [1] demonstrated that 
their attack cannot work. In the same year, Shao [9] presented an insider forgery attack to Tseng and his 
colleagues authenticated encryption scheme, and showed that their scheme cannot resist this attack. He also 
pointed out that this scheme is unable to achieve forward secrecy. Furthermore, he demonstrated another 
weakness of their schemes. Shao showed that these schemes do not have the nonrepudiation property. This 
means that in a case of dispute over the signed message the signer and receiver are unable to convince the third 
party that the message is valid.  In 2005, Zhang and Feng [13] showed that Tseng and his colleagues schemes 
are insecure against existential forgery attack. At the same year, Tsai and his colleagues [10] showed that Tseng 
and his colleagues authenticated encryption scheme cannot withstand the known plaintext-ciphertext attack. 
This means that the assailant is able to expose all messages transmitted between the signer and his specified 
receiver. In 2006, Hwang and his colleagues [6] claimed that Tseng and his colleagues scheme is insecure 
against forgery attack. They also presented an improvement for the scheme to withstand the flaw. However, 
their proposed scheme was later shown to be insecure by Rasslan [8] in 2010. In 2008, Encinas and his 
colleagues [3] showed that Tseng and his colleagues authenticated encryption schemes and several other 
schemes based on this schemes suffer from a weakness affecting the authentication of signer’s public key and 
the security of them. They also proposed some modifications in term of choosing the proper hash value for those 
schemes. 
In this paper, man-in-the-middle attacks are proposed on both Tseng and his colleagues self-certified 
authenticated encryption schemes. It would be demonstrated that these schemes are unable to resist such attacks. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the notion of signature scheme with message 
recovery is briefly reviewed. Section 3 is the review of the two variants of Tseng and his colleagues signature 
scheme. In section 4, these two schemes are shown to be insecure against man-in-the-middle attack. Eventually, 
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the conclusion is drawn in section 5. 
2. Review of signature scheme with message recovery 
In 1985, ElGamal [2] introduced a digital signature scheme based on discrete logarithm problem. In his scheme 
the message M should be sent as appendix with its signature. 
In order to keep the message M confidential, and also to reduce communication overheads an ElGamal-like 
digital signature scheme was proposed by Neyberg and Ruppel [7]. In their scheme, the message M could be 
recovered from the digital signature directly. In 2003, Tseng and his colleagues [11] proposed the digital 
signature scheme with message recovery based on Neyberg and Ruppel’s scheme. This scheme is performed in 
three phases. 
2.1. System initialization phase 
In the system initialization phase, there is a system authority (SA) that chooses and generates system 
parameters. The system authority first chooses two large prime numbers 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑞𝑞 of almost the same size such 
that 𝑝𝑝 = 2𝑝𝑝′ + 1 and 𝑞𝑞 = 2𝑞𝑞′ + 1. Then, he computes 𝑁𝑁 = 𝑝𝑝. 𝑞𝑞 . The system authority then chooses an integer 
g which is a base element of order 𝑝𝑝′. 𝑞𝑞′  . The system authority keeps 𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞, 𝑝𝑝′, 𝑞𝑞′ secret. He also publishes 𝑁𝑁 and 
𝑔𝑔, and a public one-way hash function h(.) which accepts the variant-length input string of bits and produces a 
fixed-length output string of bits as specified by NIST, which is ℎ(𝑚𝑚) < min(𝑝𝑝′, 𝑞𝑞′). When a user 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 with the 
identity 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  wants to join the system, he chooses a private key 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  randomly, and computes 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 . 
Then, 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 sends 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  and 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  to system authority. After receiving (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖), 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 computes and publishes 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖′𝑠𝑠 public 
key 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 =  ( 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)−1𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 . The user 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  can check the validity of his public key by verifying the 
equation   𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. 
2.2. Signature generation phase 
In this phase, the signer 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 wants to sign a message M which contains a predetermined  redundancy. The signer 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 first chooses an integer 𝑘𝑘 randomly. Then, 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 computes the signature (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠) for the message 𝑀𝑀 as follows. 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑀𝑀.𝑔𝑔−𝑘𝑘    𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
𝑠𝑠 = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . ℎ(𝑟𝑟)    
Then, 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  sends (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠) to the verifier. 
2.3. Message recovery phase 
After receiving (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠), any user can use the public value 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  and 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 to recover the message 𝑀𝑀 as  
𝑀𝑀 = 𝑟𝑟.𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠. ( 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)ℎ(𝑟𝑟)  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. 
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The recovered message 𝑀𝑀 must be verified by checking the validity of the embedded redundancy within it. 
3. Tseng and his colleagues self-certified digital signature schemes with message recovery. 
Tseng and his colleagues presented two variants for digital signature with message recovery. The first one is the 
authenticated encryption scheme that only allows the intended receiver to verify and recover the message. The 
other one is the authenticated encryption scheme with message linkages that is applicable for transmission of 
large messages. 
3.1. Authenticated encryption scheme 
Authenticated encryption scheme is the combination of two cryptographic protocols, encryption and digital 
signature. In this scheme only the specified receiver is able to recover and verify the message. Any other user is 
unable to do so. This scheme is also divided into three phases. The process of this scheme is given in Figure1.  
3.1.1. System initialization phase 
This phase is the same as system initialization phase in digital signature scheme with message recovery. 
3.1.2. Signature generation phase 
Suppose that a user 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 wants to sign and encrypt the message 𝑀𝑀 containing enough redundancy to a specified 
receiver 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗. The signer 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 first chooses 𝑘𝑘 at random. Then, he computes the signature (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠) for the message 𝑀𝑀 
as follows 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑀𝑀. (𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗)−𝑘𝑘 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
𝑠𝑠 = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . ℎ(𝑟𝑟). 
Then, the signer 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 sends (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠) to 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 . 
3.1.3. Message recovery phase 
Upon receiving (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠) , the specified receiver 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  first computes  𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠. ( 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)ℎ(𝑟𝑟) 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛  gk =gs. (yih(IDi) + IDi)h(r)modn gk = gs. (yih�IDj� + IDi)h(r)modn.  
Then, he applies his private key 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 to compute 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. Hence, 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 can recover 𝑀𝑀 as 𝑀𝑀 = 𝑟𝑟. (𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠( 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)ℎ(𝑟𝑟))𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. Then, the specified receiver 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 must check the validity of the recovered 𝑀𝑀 for the embedded 
redundancy within it. 
3.2. Authenticated encryption scheme with message linkages 
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This scheme is designed by Tseng and his colleagues for large messages which are divided into a sequence of 
message blocks. This scheme links up these message blocks to avoid message blocks being reordered, partially 
deleted, or replicated during transmissions. The process of the scheme is given in Figure2. 
Phases 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  
System 
initialization 
phase 
 Chooses  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖randomly. 
Computes 
 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
              (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  
 
 Computes  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 =  ( 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 −
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)−1𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛. 
Publicize 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖. 
(does the same for any 
other user who joins the 
system) 
  
Signature 
generation 
phase 
 Chooses 𝑘𝑘 randomly. 
Computes 
𝑟𝑟= 𝑀𝑀. (𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗)−𝑘𝑘  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
 
𝑠𝑠 = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . ℎ(𝑟𝑟) 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
(𝑟𝑟,𝑠𝑠)                
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  
 
Message 
recovery 
phase 
  Computes 
𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘= 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)ℎ(𝑟𝑟)𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 
, and 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝑟𝑟. (𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘)𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. 
Checks the validity of the 
redundancy. 
Figure 1: Tseng and his colleagues authenticated encryption scheme 
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3.2.1. System initialization phase 
This phase is the same as the one presented in section 2.1. 
3.2.2. Signature generation phase 
Without the loss of generality, suppose that the signer 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  wants to sign and send the large message 𝑀𝑀 to a 
specified receiver 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 .  
This message is made up of the sequence {𝑀𝑀1,…,𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛} where 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝑛𝑛), for 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁. In order to generate 
the signature for 𝑀𝑀, 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 performs the following procedure. 
1. Let  𝑟𝑟0 = 0, and choose k randomly. 
2. Compute 𝑡𝑡 = (𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗ℎ�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗� + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗)𝑘𝑘 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. 
3. Compute 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 . ℎ(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖−1 ⊕ 𝑡𝑡) 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 for 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁, where ⊕denotes the exclusive operator. 
4. Compute 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . 𝑟𝑟, where 𝑟𝑟 = ℎ(𝑟𝑟1 ∥ ⋯ ∥ 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁), and “∥” denotes the concatenation operator. 
Eventually, 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  sends 𝑛𝑛 + 2  signature blocks (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑟𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁)  to 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  in a public way. Note that 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖  is used as a 
linking parameter to generate 𝑖𝑖th and (𝑖𝑖 + 1)th message blocks. 
3.2.3. Message recovery phase 
Upon receiving the set (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑟𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁), the receiver 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 performs the following verification procedure to recover 
the message blocks {𝑀𝑀1, … ,𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁}. 
1. Compute 𝑟𝑟′ = ℎ(𝑟𝑟1 ∥ 𝑟𝑟2 ∥ ⋯ ∥ 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁), and check that 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟′ holds or not. 
2. Compute 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠. (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑟𝑟  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 , and the apply his own private key 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  to compute 
𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 which is equal to 𝑡𝑡. 
3. Recover the message blocks {𝑀𝑀1,…,𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛} as follows 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 . ℎ(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖−1 ⊕ 𝑡𝑡)−1 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁 , and 𝑟𝑟0 = 0. 
If the signer and receiver follow the procedure correctly, the message blocks {𝑀𝑀1, … ,𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁} could be recovered 
precisely. 
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Phases 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  
System 
initialization 
phase 
 Chooses  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  randomly. 
Computes 
 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
             (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  
 
 Computes  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 =  ( 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 −
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)−1𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛. 
Publicize 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖. 
 
  
Signature 
generation 
phase 
  𝑟𝑟0 = 0, and chooses a random 
k, and computes 
𝑡𝑡= �𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗ℎ�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗� + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�𝑘𝑘  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛     
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 . ℎ(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖−1 ⊕ 𝑡𝑡) 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛   
𝑟𝑟 = ℎ(𝑟𝑟1 ∥ ⋯ ∥ 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁) 
𝑠𝑠 = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . 𝑟𝑟 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
(𝑟𝑟,𝑠𝑠,𝑟𝑟1,…,𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁) 
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  
 
Message 
recovery phase 
  Computes 
𝑟𝑟′ = ℎ(𝑟𝑟1 ∥ 𝑟𝑟2 ∥ ⋯ ∥ 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁). 
Checks 𝑟𝑟=?𝑟𝑟′. 
Computes  
𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘= 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 . ℎ(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖−1 ⊕ 𝑡𝑡)−1 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
, and 𝑟𝑟0 = 0. 
Figure 2: Tseng and his colleagues authenticated encryption scheme with message linkage 
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4. Security analysis 
Tseng and his colleagues provided a security analysis for their schemes in their paper. They discussed six 
possible attacks against their schemes, and claimed that none of those attacks could break their schemes. 
However, this does not guarantee that there exists no other attack that could jeopardize the security of these 
protocols. In the following subsections, man-in-the-middle attacks are represented to their schemes, and it will 
be shown that an invader is able to intercept the transmission and forge 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖’s signature.  
4.1. Man-in-the-middle attack on Tseng and his colleagues authenticated encryption scheme 
A user 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  wants to sign a message 𝑀𝑀  to the specified user 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 .  The signature is (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠). Suppose that 𝑆𝑆  is a 
malicious attacker who intercepts the transmission without knowing the concealed message 𝑀𝑀. The procedure of 
attack is as follows. The process of the attack is given in Figure3. 
1. After intercepting (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠), 𝑆𝑆 chooses 𝑙𝑙 at random and computes  
𝑚𝑚 = 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 = 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑙. ℎ(𝑟𝑟) 
2.  𝑆𝑆 chooses an identity 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴, and computes 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑚𝑚. �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖� 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛, and sends (𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴) to 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. 
3. When 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 receives (𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴), he calculates  the attacker’s public key as  
𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴 = (𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)−1 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. 
4. 𝑆𝑆 sends (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴) to 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗, and claims it as his legal signature for 𝑀𝑀. 
The forged signature performs flawless in the message recovery phase since 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘 can be calculated 
𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 . (𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)ℎ(𝑟𝑟) 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
, and 𝑀𝑀 can be easily recovered by applying 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝑟𝑟. ( 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 . �𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴�ℎ(𝑟𝑟))𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛                                
= 𝑟𝑟. (𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠−𝑙𝑙.ℎ(𝑟𝑟). (𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴)ℎ(𝑟𝑟))𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗    𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛                                        
= 𝑟𝑟(𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠−𝑙𝑙.ℎ(𝑟𝑟). (𝑚𝑚. (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖))ℎ(𝑟𝑟))𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛               
= 𝑟𝑟. (𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠.𝑔𝑔−𝑙𝑙.ℎ(𝑟𝑟). �𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙.ℎ(𝑟𝑟). �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖��ℎ(𝑟𝑟))𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  𝑛𝑛 
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= 𝑟𝑟. (𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�)ℎ(𝑟𝑟))𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛                                  
4.2. Man-in-the-middle attack on Tseng and his colleagues authenticated encryption scheme with message 
linkages 
Suppose 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 is the signer and he is attempting to sign the large message 𝑀𝑀 which is divided to the sequence {𝑀𝑀1, … ,𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁} to the specified user 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗.  
The signature is (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑟𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁). 𝑆𝑆 is an attacker who intercepts the signature and forges a new signature without 
knowing the context of 𝑀𝑀. He forges a valid signature for 𝑀𝑀.  
The process of the attack is shown in Figure4. The process of the attack is as follows. 
1. After intercepting (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑟𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁), the attacker 𝑆𝑆 chooses the number 𝑙𝑙 at random and computes  
𝑚𝑚 = 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 = 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑙. 𝑟𝑟 
2. The attacker 𝑆𝑆 chooses the identity 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴, and computes  
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑚𝑚. �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖� 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
,and sends (𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴) to 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. 
3. After receiving (𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴), the system authority (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) computes attacker’s public key as  
𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴 = (𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)−1𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
4. 𝑆𝑆 sends (𝑟𝑟, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑟𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁) to 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 as his legal signature for 𝑀𝑀 . 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  
 Chooses  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖randomly. 
Computes 
 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
              (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  
  
Computes  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 =  ( 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 −
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)−1𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛. 
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Publicize 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖. 
(does the same for any 
other user who joins the 
system) 
 Chooses 𝑘𝑘 randomly. 
Computes 
𝑟𝑟= 𝑀𝑀. (𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑗𝑗 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗)−𝑘𝑘 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
𝑠𝑠 = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . ℎ(𝑟𝑟) 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
(𝑟𝑟,𝑠𝑠)                
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑆𝑆 intercepts  
 
  Computes 
𝑚𝑚 = 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 = 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑙. ℎ(𝑟𝑟) 
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴= 𝑚𝑚. (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)ℎ(𝑟𝑟) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
      (𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴,𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴) 
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 𝑆𝑆 
 
Computes 
𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴 = (𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 −
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)−1  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. 
Publicizes 𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴. 
  
 
 
𝑆𝑆
            (𝑟𝑟,𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴)
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  
 
 
 
 
   Computes 
𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘= 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 . (𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)+ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)ℎ(𝑟𝑟) 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
, and recovers 
𝑀𝑀 =
𝑟𝑟. (𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘)𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. 
Checks the validity of 
the redundancy. 
Figure 3: Man-in-the-middle attack on Tseng and his colleagues authenticated encryption scheme 
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𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  
 Chooses  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖randomly. 
Computes 
 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛.               (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 
  
Computes  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 =  ( 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)−1. 
Publicize 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖. 
(does the same for any other user who 
joins the system) 
   
  𝑟𝑟0 = 0, and chooses k randomly. 
 Computes 𝑡𝑡 = (𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗ℎ�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗� +
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗)𝑘𝑘 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. , and 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 . ℎ(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖−1 ⊕ 𝑡𝑡) 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛, 
 𝑟𝑟 = ℎ(𝑟𝑟1 ∥ ⋯ ∥ 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁), 
𝑠𝑠 = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . 𝑟𝑟 (𝑟𝑟,𝑠𝑠,𝑟𝑟1,…,𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁) 
�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 
  
   Computes 
𝑟𝑟′ = ℎ(𝑟𝑟1 ∥ 𝑟𝑟2 ∥ ⋯ ∥ 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁). 
Checks 𝑟𝑟=?𝑟𝑟′. 
Computes  
𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘= 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)+ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
and 
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖= 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 . ℎ(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖−1
⊕ 𝑡𝑡)−1 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 
Figure 4: Man-in-the-middle attack on Tseng and his colleagues authenticated encryption scheme with message 
linkages 
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The forged signature performs properly in the message recovery phase since 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘 can be calculated as 
𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 . (𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠−𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴)𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛                                                                                             = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠 .𝑔𝑔−𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 . �𝑚𝑚�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�𝑟𝑟� 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛                                                                                              = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠.𝑔𝑔−𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟(𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟��𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�𝑟𝑟�𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛                                                                       = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛                                            =  𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛. 
The reason of this attack affecting these two schemes is that in these two schemes the amount 𝑟𝑟 in the signature 
contains the message in ciphertext, and the amount 𝑠𝑠 contains the private key of signer. In both man- in-the-
middle attacks, all that the attacker has to do is keeping 𝑟𝑟 without change to protect the message 𝑀𝑀, and change 
the amount of 𝑠𝑠 to forge a new signature with his own identity. 
Note that in the first scheme 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . ℎ(𝑟𝑟), and the attacker is not aware of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . When he computes 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 = 𝑠𝑠 −
𝑙𝑙. ℎ(𝑟𝑟), he adds 𝑙𝑙 to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 since 
𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 = 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑙. ℎ(𝑟𝑟)                           = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . ℎ(𝑟𝑟) − 𝑙𝑙. ℎ(𝑟𝑟)                     = 𝑘𝑘 − (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑙𝑙). ℎ(𝑟𝑟). 
Therefore, to forge the message he only should choose a valid identity and 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 for 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴. Thus he chooses 
𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙+𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛 as 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 ( the same logic stands for the attack to the scheme with message linkages). 
5. Conclusion 
This paper reviews Tseng and his colleagues self-certified authenticated encryption schemes with message 
recovery. It provides man-in-the-middle attacks on both its variants, and shows that these schemes are 
vulnerable to this kind of attack. In both schemes a malicious attacker who is able to intercept the transmissions 
can forge a signature of a message without knowing the context of message. Thus, even though Tseng and his 
colleagues demonstrated that their schemes are secure against a number of possible attacks under the assumption 
that computing discrete logarithms modulo a large composite number and the one way hash function are 
difficult, they cannot resist man-in-the-middle attack. 
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